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ABSTRACT
Adversarial training has been demonstrated as one of the most effective methods
for training robust models so as to defend against adversarial examples. However,
adversarial training often lacks adversarially robust generalization on unseen data.
Recent works show that adversarially trained models may be more biased towards
global structure features. Instead, in this work, we would like to investigate the
relationship between the generalization of adversarial training and the robust local
features, as the local features generalize well for unseen shape variation. To learn
the robust local features, we develop a Random Block Shuffle (RBS) transforma-
tion to break up the global structure features on normal adversarial examples. We
continue to propose a new approach called Robust Local Features for Adversarial
Training (RLFAT), which first learns the robust local features by adversarial train-
ing on the RBS-transformed adversarial examples, and then transfers the robust
local features into the training of normal adversarial examples. Finally, we im-
plement RLFAT in two currently state-of-the-art adversarial training frameworks.
Extensive experiments on STL-10, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 datasets show that RL-
FAT improves the adversarially robust generalization as well as the standard gen-
eralization of adversarial training. Additionally, we demonstrate that our method
captures more local features of the object, aligning better with human perception.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has achieved a remarkable performance breakthrough on various challenging bench-
marks in machine learning fields, such as image classification (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) and speech
recognition (Hinton et al., 2012). However, recent studies (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al.,
2015) have revealed that deep neural network models are strikingly susceptible to adversarial ex-
amples, in which small perturbations around the input are sufficient to mislead the predictions of the
target model. Moreover, such perturbations are almost imperceptible to humans and often transfer
across diverse models to achieve black-box attacks (Papernot et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017).
Though the emergence of adversarial examples has received significant attention and resulted in
various defend approaches for robust models (Madry et al., 2018; Dhillon et al., 2018; Wang & Yu,
2019; Song et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019a), many proposed defense methods provide few bene-
fits for the true robustness but mask the gradients on which most attacks rely (Carlini & Wagner,
2017a; Athalye et al., 2018; Uesato et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019). Currently, one of the best tech-
niques to defend against adversarial attacks (Athalye et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019) is adversarial
training (Madry et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019a), which improves the robustness by training on
adversarial examples.
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Among substantial works of adversarial training, there still remains a big robust generalization
gap (Schmidt et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019b; Ding et al., 2019). The robustness of adversarial
training fails to generalize on unseen testing data. Recent works (Geirhos et al., 2019; Zhang &
Zhu, 2019) further show that adversarially trained models capture more on global structure features
but normally trained models are more biased towards local features. Intuitively, the global struc-
ture features tend to be robust against adversarial perturbations but hard to generalize for unseen
shape variations, instead the local features generalize well for unseen shape variations but are hard
to generalize on adversarial perturbation. It naturally raises an intriguing question for adversarial
training:
For adversarial training, is it possible to learn the robust local features , which have better adver-
sarially robust generalization and better standard generalization?
To address this question, we investigate the relationship between the generalization of adversarial
training and the robust local features, and advocate for learning robust local features for adversarial
training. Our main contributions are as follows:
• To our knowledge, this is the first work that sheds light on the relationship between adversarial
training and robust local features. Specifically, we develop a Random Block Shuffle (RBS)
transformation to study such relationship by breaking up the global structure features on normal
adversarial examples.
• We propose a novel method called Robust Local Features for Adversarial Training (RLFAT),
which learns the robust local features and transfers the information of robust local features into
the training on normal adversarial examples.
• We implement RLFAT in two state-of-the-art adversarial training frameworks, PGD Adversarial
Training (PGDAT) (Madry et al., 2018) and TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019a). Experiments show
consistent and substantial improvements for both adversarial robustness and standard accuracy
on several standard datasets. Moreover, the sensitivity maps of our models on images tend to
align better with human perception.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some notations and provide a brief description on advanced methods
for adversarial attacks and adversarial training.
2.1 NOTATION
Let F (x) be a probabilistic classifier based on a neural network with the logits function f(x) and the
probability distribution pF (·|x). Let L(F ;x, y) be the cross entropy loss for image classification.
The goal of the adversary is to find an adversarial example x′ ∈ Bp (x) := {x′ : ‖x′ − x‖p ≤ } in
the `p norm bounded perturbation, where  denotes the magnitude of the perturbation. In this paper,
we focus on p =∞ to align with previous works.
2.2 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Projected Gradient Descent. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018) is a stronger
iterative variant of Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2015). The goal is to
iteratively solve the optimization problem maxx′:‖x′−x‖∞< L (F ;x′, y) with a step size α:
x0 ∼ U (B∞ (x)) ,
xt+1 = ΠB∞ (x)
(
xt − α sign (∇xL(F ;x, y)|xt)
)
,
(1)
where U denotes the uniform distribution, and ΠB∞ (x) indicates the projection of the set B∞ (x).
Carlini-Wagner attack. Carlini-Wagner attack (CW) (2017b) is a sophisticated method to directly
solve for the adversarial example xadvn by using an auxiliary variable wn:
xadvn = 0.5 · (tanh(wn) + 1) . (2)
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The objective function to optimize the auxiliary variable wn is defined as:
min
wn
∥∥xadvn − xn∥∥+ c · F (xadvn ) , (3)
where F(xadv) = max (fytrue(xadv)−max{fi(xadv) : i 6= ytrue} ,−k). The constant k controls
the confidence gap between the adversarial class and the true class.
Nattack. N attack (Li et al., 2019) is a derivative-free black-box adversarial attack method and
it breaks many of the defense methods based on gradient masking. The basic idea is to learn a
probability density distribution over a small region centered around the clean input, such that a
sample drawn from this distribution is likely to be an adversarial example.
2.3 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Despite the intense interest in developing defenses, Athalye et al. (2018) and Li et al. (2019) have
broken most previous defense methods (Dhillon et al., 2018; Buckman et al., 2018; Wang & Yu,
2019; Zhang et al., 2019a), and revealed that adversarial training remains one of the best defense
method. The basic idea for adversarial training is to solve the min-max optimization problem, as
shown in Eq. (4):
min
F
max
x′:‖x′−x‖∞<
L (F ;x′, y) . (4)
We introduce two currently state-of-the-art adversarial training frameworks.
PGD adversarial training. PGD Adversarial Training (PGDAT) (Madry et al., 2018) uses the PGD
attack for generating adversarial examples, whose objective function is formalized as follows:
LPGD(F ;x, y) = L(F ;x′PGD, y) , (5)
where x′PGD is obtained via PGD attack on the cross entropy L(F ;x, y).
TRADES. Zhang et al. (2019a) propose TRADES to specifically maximize the trade-off of adver-
sarial training between adversarial robustness and standard accuracy by optimizing the following
regularized surrogate loss:
LTRADES(F ;x, y) = L(F ;x, y) + λDKL ( pF (·|x) ‖ pF (·|x′PGD[x]) ) , (6)
where x′PGD[x] is obtained via PGD attack on the KL-divergence DKL ( pF (·|x) ‖ pF (·|x′) ); λ is
a hyper-parameter to control the trade-off between adversarial robustness and standard accuracy.
3 ROBUST LOCAL FEATURES FOR ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Different from adversarially trained models, normally trained models are more biased towards the
local features but vulnerable to adversarial examples (Geirhos et al., 2019). It indicates that in
contrast to global structural features, local features seems be more well-generalized but less robust
against adversarial perturbation. Thus, in this work, we focus on the learning of robust local features
by adversarial training, and propose a novel form of adversarial training called RLFAT that learns
the robust local features and transfers the robust local features into the training of normal adversarial
examples. In this way, our adversarially trained models are not only robust against adversarial
examples but also show great generalization on unseen testing data.
3.1 ROBUST LOCAL FEATURE LEARNING
It’s known that normal adversarial training tends to capture global structure features so as to increase
invariance against adversarial perturbations (Zhang & Zhu, 2019; Ilyas et al., 2019). To advocate for
the learning of robust local features on adversarial training, we propose a simple and straight-forward
image transformation called Random Block Shuffle (RBS) to break up the global structure features
of the images, at the same time retaining the local features. Specifically, for an input image, we
randomly split the target image into k blocks horizontally and randomly shuffle the blocks, then we
perform the same split-shuffle operation vertically on the resulting image. As illustrated in Figure 1,
RBS transformation can destroy the global structure features of the images to some extent and retain
the local features of the images.
3
Figure 1: Illustration of the RBS transformation for k = 3. For a better understanding on the RBS
transformation, we paint the split image blocks with different colors.
Then we apply the RBS transformation on adversarial training. Different from normal adversarial
training, we use the RBS-transformed adversarial examples rather than normal adversarial examples
as the adversarial information to encourage the models to learn robust local features. Note that we
only use the RBS transformation as a tool to learn the robust local features during adversarial training
and will not use RBS transformation in the inference phase. we refer to the form of adversarial
training as RBS Adversarial Training (RBSAT).
We consider two currently state-of-the-art adversarial training frameworks, PGD Adversarial Train-
ing (PGDAT) (Madry et al., 2018) and TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019a), to demonstrate the effective-
ness of the robust local features.
We use the following loss function as the alternative to the objective function of PGDAT:
LRLFLPGDAT(F ;x, y) = L(F ; RBS(x′PGD), y) , (7)
where RBS(·) denotes the RBS transformation; x′PGD is obtained via PGD attack on the cross
entropy L(F ;x, y).
Similarly, we use the following loss function as the alternative to the objective function of TRADES:
LRLFLTRADES(F ;x, y) = L(F ;x, y) + λDKL [ pF (·|x) ‖ pF (·|RBS (x′PGD[x])) ] , (8)
where x′PGD[x] is obtained via PGD attack on the KL-divergence DKL ( pF (·|x) ‖ pF (·|x′) ).
3.2 ROBUST LOCAL FEATURE TRANSFER
To transfer the knowledge of robust local features learned by RBSAT to the normal adversarial
examples, we present a knowledge transfer scheme, called Robust Local Feature Transfer (RLFT).
The goal of RLFT is to learn the representation that minimizes the feature shift between the normal
adversarial examples and the RBS-transformed adversarial examples.
Specifically, we apply the RLFT on the logit layer for high-level feature alignment. Formally, the ob-
jective functions of robust local feature transfer for PGDAT and TRADES are formalized as follows,
respectively:
LRLFTPGDAT(F ;x, y) = ‖f(RBS(x′PGD))− f(x′PGD)‖22 ,
LRLFTTRADES(F ;x, y) = ‖f(RBS(x′PGD[x]))− f(x′PGD[x])‖22 ,
(9)
where f(·) denotes the mapping of the logits layer, and ‖·‖22 denotes the squared Euclidean norm.
3.3 OVERALL OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
Since the quality of robust local feature transfer depends on the quality of robust local features
learned by RBSAT, we integrate RLFT and RBSAT into an end-to-end training framework, which
we refer to as RLFAT (Robust Local Features for Adversarial Training). The training process of
RLFAT is summarized in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Robust Local Features for Adversarial Training (RLFAT).
1: Randomly initialize network F (x);
2: Number of iterations t← 0;
3: repeat
4: t← t+ 1;
5: Read a minibatch of data {x1, ..., xm} from the training set;
6: Generate the normal adversarial examples {xadv1 , ..., xadvm }
7: Obtain the RBS-transformed adversarial examples {RBS(xadv1 ), ...,RBS(xadvm )} ;
8: Calculate the overall loss following Eq. (10).
9: Update the parameters of network F through back propagation;
10: until the training converges.
We implement RLFAT in two state-of-the-art adversarial training frameworks, PGDAT and
TRADES, and have new objective functions to learn the robust and well-generalized feature rep-
resentations, which we call RLFATP and RLFATT:
LRLFATP(F ;x, y) = LRLFLPGDAT(F ;x, y) + ηLRLFTPGDAT(F ;x, y),
LRLFATT(F ;x, y) = LRLFLTRADES(F ;x, y) + ηLRLFTTRADES(F ;x, y),
(10)
where η is a hyper-parameter to balance the two terms.
4 EXPERIMENTS
To validate the effectiveness of RLFAT, we empirically evaluate our two implementations, denoted
as RLFATP and RLFATT, and show that RLFAT makes significant improvement on both robust
accuracy and standard accuracy on standard benchmark datasets.
4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Baselines. Since most previous defense methods provide few benefit in true adversarially robust-
ness (Athalye et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019), we compare the proposed method with two state-of-
the-art adversarial training defenses, PGD Adversarial Training (PGDAT) (Madry et al., 2018) and
TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019a).
Adversarial setting. We consider two attack settings with the bounded `∞ norm: the white-box
attack setting and the black-box attack setting. For the white-box attack setting, we use existing
strongest white-box attacks: Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018) and Carlini-
Wagner attack (CW) (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b). For the black-box attack setting, we perform the
powerful black-box attack, N attack (Li et al., 2019), on a sample of 1,500 test inputs as it is time-
consuming.
Datasets. We compare the proposed methods with the baselines on widely used benchmark
datasets, namely CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009). Since adversarial train-
ing becomes increasingly hard for high dimensional data and a little training data (Schmidt et al.,
2018), we also consider one challenging dataset: STL-10 (Coates et al.), which contains 5, 000
training images, with 96× 96 pixels per image.
Neural networks. For STL-10, the architecture we consider is a wide ResNet 40-2; for CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100, we use a wide ResNet w32-10 (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016). For all datasets,
we scale the input images to the range of [0, 1].
Hyper-parameters. To avoid posting much concentrates on optimizing the hyper-parameters, for
all datasets, we set the hyper-parameter λ in TRADES as 6, set the hyper-parameter η in RLFATP
as 0.5, and set the hyper-parameter η in RLFATT as 1. For the training jobs of all our models, we
set the hyper-parameters k of the RBS transformation as 2. More details about the hyper-parameters
are provided in Appendix A.
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4.2 EVALUATION RESULTS
We first validate our hypothesis: for adversarial training, is it possible to learn the robust local
features that have better adversarially robust generalization and better standard generalization?
In Table 1, we compare the accuracy of RLFATP and RLFATT with the competing baselines on
three standard datasets. The proposed models demonstrate consistent and significant improvements
on adversarial robustness as well as standard accuracy over the baseline models on all datasets.
With the robust local features, RLFATT achieves better adversarially robust generalization and
better standard generalization than TRADES. RLFATP also works similarly, showing a significant
improvement on the robustness against all attacks and standard accuracy than PGDAT.
Table 1: The classification accuracy (%) of defense methods under white-box and black-box attacks
on STL-10, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
(a) STL-10. The magnitude of perturbation is 0.03 in `∞ norm.
Defense No attack PGD CW N attack
PGDAT 67.05 30.00 31.97 34.80
TRADES 65.24 38.99 38.35 42.07
RLFATP 71.47 38.42 38.42 44.80
RLFATT 72.38 43.36 39.31 48.13
(b) CIFAR-10. The magnitude of perturbation is 0.03 in `∞ norm.
Defense No attack PGD CW N attack
PGDAT 82.96 46.19 46.41 46.67
TRADES 80.35 50.95 49.80 52.47
RLFATP 84.77 53.97 52.40 54.60
RLFATT 82.72 58.75 51.94 54.60
(c) CIFAR-100. The magnitude of perturbation is 0.03 in `∞ norm.
Defense No attack PGD CW N attack
PGDAT 55.86 23.32 22.87 22.47
TRADES 52.13 27.26 24.66 25.13
RLFATP 56.70 31.99 29.04 32.53
RLFATT 58.96 31.63 27.54 30.86
The results demonstrate that, the robust local features can significantly improve both the adver-
sarially robust generalization and the standard generalization over the state-of-the-art adversarial
training frameworks, and strongly support our hypothesis. That is, for adversarial training, it is
possible to learn the robust local features, which have better robust and standard generalization.
4.3 LOSS SENSITIVITY UNDER DISTRIBUTION SHIFT
Motivation. Ding et al. (2019) and Zhang et al. (2019b) found that the effectiveness of adversarial
training is highly sensitive to the “semantic-loss” shift of the test data distribution, such as gamma
mapping. To further investigate the defense performance of the proposed methods, we consider to
quantify the smoothness of the models on different test data distributions. In particular, we use the
uniform noise adding and gamma mapping to shift the test data distribution.
-neighborhood loss sensitivity. To quantify the smoothness of models on the shift of the uniform
noise, we propose to estimate the Lipschitz continuity constant `F by using the gradients of the
loss function with respect to the -neighborhood region of the test data. A smaller value indicates a
smoother loss function.
`uF =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Ex′i∼U(B∞ (xi))[‖∇xL(F ;x′i, ytrue)‖2] (11)
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Gamma mapping loss sensitivity. Gamma mapping (Szeliski, 2011) is a nonlinear element-wise
operation used to adjust the exposure of images by applying x˜(γ) = xγ on the original image x.
Similarly, we approximate the loss sensitivity under gamma mapping, by using the gradients of the
loss function with respect to the gamma mapping test data. A smaller value indicates a smoother
loss function.
`gF (γ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
‖∇xL(F ;xγi , ytrue)‖2 (12)
Sensitivity analysis. The results for the -neighborhood loss sensitivity of the adversarially trained
models are reported in Table 2a, where we use 100 Monte Carlo samples for each test data. In Ta-
ble 2b, we report the loss sensitivity of the adversarially trained models under various gamma map-
pings. We can observe that RLFATT provides the smoothest model with the robust local features
under the distribution shifts on various datasets. The results suggest that, as compared to PGDAT
and TRADES, RLFATP and RLFATT both show lower gradients of the models on different data
distributions, which we can directly attribute to the robust local features.
Table 2: The loss sensitivity of defense methods under different data distributions.
(a) The -neighborhood loss sensitivity of the adversarially trained models.
Dataset
-neighborhood loss sensitivity `uF
PGDAT TRADES RLFATP RLFATT
STL-10 0.76 0.43 0.20 0.20
CIFAR-10 1.17 0.76 0.63 0.49
CIFAR-100 2.74 1.73 1.03 0.91
(b) The gamma mapping loss sensitivity of the adversarially trained models.
Dataset
Gamma mapping loss sensitivity `gF (0.8) / `
g
F (1.2)
PGDAT TRADES RLFATP RLFATT
STL-10 0.77 / 0.79 0.44 / 0.42 0.30 / 0.29 0.21 / 0.19
CIFAR-10 1.27 / 1.20 0.84 / 0.76 0.69 / 0.62 0.54 / 0.48
CIFAR-100 2.82 / 2.80 1.78 / 1.76 1.09 / 1.01 0.95 / 0.88
4.4 ABLATION STUDIES
To further gain insights on the performance obtained by the robust local features, we perform ab-
lation studies to dissect the impact of various components (robust local feature learning and robust
local feature transfer). As shown in Figure 2, we conduct additional experiments for the ablation
studies of RLFATP and RLFATT on STL-10, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, where we report the
standard accuracy over clean data and average robust accuracy over all attacks for each model.
Does robust local feature learning help? We first analyze that as compared to adversarial train-
ing on normal adversarial examples, whether adversarial training on RBS-transformed adversarial
examples produces better generalization and more robust features. As in Figure 2, we can see that
Robust Local Features Learning (RLFL) exhibits stable improvements on both standard accuracy
and robust accuracy on all datasets for RLFATP and RLFATT, providing strong support for our
hypothesis.
Does robust local feature transfer help? We further add Robust Local Feature Transfer (RLFT),
the second term in Eq. (10), to get the overall loss of RLFAT. The standard accuracy further increases
on all datasets for RLFATP and RLFATT. The robust accuracy further increases also, except for
RLFATP on CIFAR-100 for the no-attack setting, but it is still clearly higher than the baseline
model. It shows the robust local feature transfer to the normal adversarial training does help promote
the standard accuracy and robust accuracy in most cases.
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(a) STL-10 (b) CIFAR-10 (c) CIFAR-100
Figure 2: Ablation studies for RLFATP and RLFATT to investigate the impact of Robust Local
Feature Learning (RLFL) and Robust Local Feature Transfer (RLFT).
4.5 VISUALIZING THE SALIENCE MAPS
We would like to investigate the features of the input images that the models are mostly focused
on. Following the work of Zhang & Zhu (2019), we generate the sensitivity maps using Smooth-
Grad (Smilkov et al., 2017) on STL-10. The key idea of SmoothGrad is to average the gradients
of class activation with respect to noisy copies of an input image. As illustrated in Figure 3, all
adversarially trained models focus on the global structure features of the object on the images. And
as compared to PGDAT and TRADES, RLFATP and RLFATT both capture more local feature
information of the object, aligning better with human perception. Note that the images are correctly
classified by all these models. For more visualization results, see Appendix B.
Original PGDAT TRADES RLFATP RLFATT Original PGDAT TRADES RLFATP RLFATT
Figure 3: Sensitivity maps of the four models on sampled images. For each group of images, we
have the original image, and sensitivity maps of the four models sequentially.
5 CONCLUSION
Differs to existing adversarial training models that are more biased towards the global features of
the images, in this paper, we hypothesize that robust local features can improve the generalization
8
of adversarial training. To validate this hypothesis, we propose a new stream of adversarial training
approach called Robust Local Features for Adversarial Training (RLFAT) and implement it in state-
of-the-art adversarial training frameworks, PGDAT and TRADES. Extensive experiments show that
the proposed methods based on RLFAT not only yield better standard generalization but also pro-
mote the adversarially robust generalization. Furthermore, we show that the sensitivity maps of
our models on images align better with human perception, uncovering certain unexpected benefit of
robust local features for adversarial training.
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A HYPER-PARAMETER SETTING
Here we show the details of the training hyper-parameters and the attack hyper-parameters for the
experiments.
Training Hyper-parameters. For all training tasks, we use the Adam optimizer with a learning rate
of 0.001 and a batch size of 32. For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we run 79,800 steps for training. For
STL-10, we run 29,700 steps for training. For STL-10 and CIFAR-100, the adversarial examples are
generated with step size 0.0075, 7 iterations, and  = 0.03. For CIFAR-10, the adversarial examples
are generated with step size 0.0075, 10 iterations, and  = 0.03.
Attack Hyper-parameters. For PGD attack, we use the same attack parameters as those of the
training process. For CW attack, we use PGD to minimize its loss function with a high confidence
parameter (k = 50) following the work of Madry et al. (2018). For N attack, we set the maximum
number of optimization iterations to T = 200, b = 300 for the sample size, the variance of the
isotropic Gaussian σ2 = 0.01, and the learning rate η = 0.008.
B MORE FEATURE VISUALIZATION
We provide more sensitive maps of the adversarially trained models on sampled images in Figure 4.
Original PGDAT TRADES RLFATP RLFATT Original PGDAT TRADES RLFATP RLFATT
Figure 4: More sensitivity maps of the four models. For each group of images, we have the
original image, and sensitivity maps of of the four models sequentially.
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